

La migración como un elemento de seguridad que afronta Europa

Migration as a Security Challenge Facing the Europe

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Recepción: Octubre 2008

Aceptación: Diciembre 2008

RESUMEN

Después de la guerra fría, cuestiones a la vez viejas y nuevas han vuelto a la agenda de debates de la seguridad europea. Una de estas cuestiones es todo lo relativo a las minorías y a la migración. La cuestión de la migración afecta a conceptos centrales como las fronteras y la política de frontera, la seguridad, la soberanía, la ciudadanía y la identidad. Aunque la inmigración no es un fenómeno nuevo, durante las dos últimas décadas ha habido un cambio incremental hacia la politización de la cuestión. Hoy en día el terrorismo, la delincuencia transfronteriza, el tráfico de drogas y la inmigración han sustituido a los conflictos fronterizos tradicionales como fuentes principales de inseguridad para los países de Unión Europea. La migración se ha convertido en parte de los nuevos programas de seguridad nacional. En muchos casos los inmigrantes y refugiados se han convertido en un importante foco que aumenta de la sensación de inseguridad.

Palabras Clave: Unión Europea, Migración, Política de Seguridad

ABSTRACT

After the Cold War, new/old issues returned to the agenda of European security debates. One of them is minority issues as well as migration. The issue of migration touches upon central concepts such as borders and border politics, security, sovereignty, citizenship and identity. While the immigration is not a new phenomenon, during the last two decades there has been an incremental shift toward the politicization and securitization of the issue. Nowadays terrorism, cross-border crime, drug-trafficking and immigration have replaced traditional frontier disputes as main sources of insecurity for countries of EU. Migration has become part of the new national security agendas. In many cases immigrants and refugees become the source of feeling of insecurity.

Keywords: European Union, Migration, Security Policy

Clasificación JEL: B15

1. INTRODUCTION

After the Cold War, new/old issues returned to the agenda of European security debates. One of them is minority issues as well as migration. The issue of migration touches upon central concepts such as borders and border politics, security, sovereignty, citizenship and identity. While the immigration is not a new phenomenon, during the last two decades there has been an incremental shift toward the politicization and securitization of the issue. Nowadays terrorism, cross-border crime, drug-trafficking and immigration have replaced traditional frontier disputes as main sources of insecurity for countries of EU. Migration has become part of the new national security agendas. In many cases immigrants and refugees become the source of feeling of insecurity.

I will concentrate here on migration and its specific in Europe. Is it a threat or challenge to security? In short I explain such terms like security and mostly societal security in International Relations. It is also important to answer how the process of migration is securitize and how to desecuritize it, if it possible at all.

2. MIGRATION

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Migration relies on permanent or temporary omission by single persons, groups, even whole societies from the place where they constantly live to another place¹. We can distinguish many types of migration. According to time criteria there are permanent and temporary migration. Permanent migrants intend to establish their permanent residence in a new country and possibly obtain that country's citizenship. Temporary migrants intend only to stay for a limited period of time. Territorial criteria distinguish internal (In 2007, there were 26 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in at least 52 countries as a result of conflict compared to 24.5 million IDPs in 52 countries the year before²) and external migration. Compulsion criteria distinguish voluntary (highly skilled and business migration, educational migration) and forced migration (refuges, asylum seekers). According to legal status criteria there are illegal (undocumented migration) and legal migration. Number criteria distinguish individual, group or mass migration. All this criteria are related. And because of large number and dynamics of migration process it is very difficult to describe it using only one criterion³.

In EU countries we can distinguish two general types of migrant:

1. Citizens of members states of the Union who are free to move within EU: these are protected under Union treaties, have their interests articulated by

various EU institution, can apply for binding decision on the part of the court of the EU, and enjoy the aid of special programmes initiated by the Union.

2. Citizens of nation states who do not belong to the Union and who must undergo extensive controls that are being harmonized between the member states⁴.

According to the *International Organization for Migration* data there are more than 200 million migrants around the world today. Europe (including Russia) hosted the largest number of immigrants, with 70.6 million people in 2005, the latest year for which figures are available. North America, with over 45.1 million immigrants, is second, followed by Asia, which hosts nearly 25.3 million with tendency to growth⁵. There are currently about 40 million expatriates (foreign-born individuals) in the EU27 countries, representing about 8.3 per cent of their total population. Migration patterns vary across EU member states. In fact, there is considerable heterogeneity across different EU countries, both in terms of immigrant characteristics as well as countries of origin.




Figure 1. Source OECD

Among countries hosting the largest number of international migration in 2005 there are four European countries: Germany, France, Great Britain and Spain. The most popular place of destination of migrant are Ireland, Italy, Norway and Portugal⁶. In recent years the number of countries of origin from which people migrate has multiplied. In

Germany in 1960s there were dozen countries of origin from which people migrated, compared to 2004 there were approximately 50% of migrants who came from ten countries like Turkey, Poland, Russia, US, and states of the former Yugoslavian territory. The remaining 50% of migrant came from over 100 different countries⁷. This leads to diversity of Europe in terms of religion, culture, language, ethnics etc.

In temporary political debate migration has been perceived by some as a threat to domestic public order, i.e. it has become to be seen as a security problem along with drug-trafficking, organized crime, and terrorism⁸. There are many aspects of the migration-security link. According to W. Anioł international migration in relation to the international security can play three roles:

- 1) International migration can be a consequence of other security threats like human rights violation, ethnic conflict, civil war;
- 2) International migration can by itself constitute a threat to international security when it is of massive, uncontrolled character;
- 3) International migration can result in other security threats (e.g. xenophobia and racial violence)⁹.

There arise some question, if migration is a challenge or threat? Is it a challenge/threat to the state security or to the international community? Are there any instruments which could help to solve it?

3. SECURITY

Security can be defined as the freedom from the threats or as a state or condition is *resistance to harm*. Latin "*Se-Cura*," means literally "without care" as in "carefree". As one of the more famous conceptual writing in IR on security said:

"In the case of security, the discussion is about the pursuit of freedom from threat. When this discussion is in the context of the international system, security is about the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity" (Buzan 1991: 18-19)¹⁰.

The traditional view of security has focused on using the military to ensure the territorial integrity of sovereign states. Nevertheless scholars, specially from the field of Critical Security Studies¹¹, and policy makers began to recognize that even successful examples of territorial security do not necessarily ensure the security of citizens within a state. Perceiving states as the "egg-shells" protecting "their" citizens. In the 90. analysts began to recognize other threats than traditional ones¹². This has involved a reconceptualization of security¹³. B. Buzan distinguishes five sectors of security:

military, political, economic, environmental, societal¹⁴. All of them were ultimately sectors of state security. The state can be threatened by many things other than military threats. But as O. Wæver argues all these sectors do involve individuals. He also propose a reconceptualisation of the security field. According to him we should talk about the duality of state security and societal security¹⁵.

In the societal sector the referent objects are large-scale collective identities (ethno-national and religious), which evolve in conjunction with internal and external developments¹⁶. According to Wæver state security can be influenced by the security or insecurity of a society on which it is based. The **referent object of societal security is society**. In the case when society and state overlap then there is no difference between state and societal security but when nation and state do not coincide, the security of the nation will often increase the insecurity of the state and vice versa¹⁷. Societal security has to be understood first of all as the security of a social agent which has an independent reality. Their security or insecurity could influence on the security of the country.

*“In the contemporary international system, societal security concerns the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing condition and possible and actual threats” (Wæver1993: 23)*¹⁸

Societal security is about situation when societies perceive a threat in identity terms. Security is not so much about security between states but between societies (often within states). As such, it consists not only of an expansion of security, but it is also a move away from the state-centric view to other reference points such as ethnic minority groups, migration, eventually proposing a duality of state *and* societal security.

4. THREATS TO SOCIETAL SECURITY

When we talk about threats we think about fears. What scares us? If we define that we may try to avoid it. It is important to notice that not all process will be perceived as threats. There are two dimension of security, subjective and objective. With security what is perceived as a threat, and what can be objectively assessed as threading, may be quite different. Real threats may not be accurately seen, and the perceived threats may not be real, and still have real effects¹⁹. (Figure 2)

We can specify there four situations:

1. security,
2. insecurity,
3. obsession, and
4. false security.

We can talk of security when there is no objective threats and we are not scared. Insecurity is opposite to the previous. We can talk here about real threats and we are consciousness. Obsession is when there are no real threats but we feel unsecure but threats exist only in our minds. False security is when threats objectively exist but we are not conscious of them. So security in many cases is a very subjective feeling.



Figure 2: Dimension of security

Wæver and Buzan introduce the conception of security as a *speech act*. That means that the issue becomes a matter of security when it is presented as such, not necessarily because in reality it exist as such. Such a threat requires a specific response and legitimizes emergency in the action²⁰. So the importance is how to securitize the problem.

By securitization this proponents means how a certain issue is transformed by an actor into a matter of security. For the securitization act to be successful it must be accepted by the audience²¹.

And we have to underline that public attitudes change significantly in response to exposure to new ideas and an important local and international event.

According to Buzan the main threats to security come from competing identities and migration. These threats may overlap if the competing identity is largely carried by migration. Threats from competing identities arise when they are mutually exclusive.

But even then threats occur only if the societies compete for territory or if the overbearing influence of the one disrupts the reproduction of the other. The threat of migration is fundamentally a question of how relative numbers interact with the absorptive and adaptive capacities of society²².

It is also important to notice that threats to societal security come also from other sectors or security²³. It is quite obvious that if a state is threatened militarily then also society is threatened within it. With some exception i.e. external threat is aimed at liberating an “oppressed” minority, or military threats are aimed at removing tyrannical government, or liberating societies from imperial occupation. We can also point out an internal military threat, like when the armed forces act to suppress all or part of society, on their own behalf or on behalf of political party. There is also a less direct military threat to society like conscription. Then the military service become a mechanism of oppression and eroding subnational identities.

Political sector linked with behavior and politics operation by the government. The state-nation process is often directly aimed at suppressing or at least homogenizing, sub-state societal identities. It is when governments support one ethnic group or represent their interest and in the same fight against the other. This lead us to security dilemma. Because government implements two internal contradictory functions. When government protect or favor one social group and in the same time and create insecurity for the other.

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Economic sector and its relations with societal security is very complex. Just mention capitalist economy were societies must be prepared to make continuous and often rapid adjustments in order to adapt themselves to change in scale, technology, competition etc. It is also dealt with the welfare state.

It is also an ecological sector of security. It is related with societal security because ecological disasters create massive flows of people (environmental migration).

5. SECURITIZATION OF MIGRATION

It is important to distinguish which values, protected as components of security, might be threatened by international migration and its consequences. A. Kicinger introduce fifth of them²³: social stability, demographic security, cultural identity, social security and welfare state, internal security. Social stability may be at risk when the inflow of immigrants is combined with the rise of xenophobia, lack of integration in the case of specific characteristic of migrants including high cultural or religious differences.

International migration can influence the demographic security, when high rates of emigration might change the demographic structure of the hosted society specially in

case of aging of population going together with low birth rate. International migration can pose a risk to cultural identity which might be illustrated by the so-called “headscarves affair” in France as an example or by the rising popularity of extremist right-wing parties in response to high immigration levels. International migration can pose a threat to social security system and welfare state philosophy. People might not be willing to pay high taxes if they do not feel that the other do the same and share the same values which is true in case of economically inactive immigrants and asylum seekers living on social benefits, but there is also a threat because of migration of highly qualified people.

The international migration might be a risk to internal security which is illustrated e.g. by the crime levels among the immigrants that are higher than among the native population; international crime networks dealing with drugs and arms; trafficking in human beings or, last but not least, terrorists using both legal and illegal migration channels to penetrate the country as well as the danger of so called “refugee warriors”²⁴.

J. Huysmans argues that one turned into a security problem according to which the migrant appears as the other who has entered a harmonious world and, just by having entered it, has disturbed the harmony. For inhabitants harmony means many concrete things. They are afraid of migrants because they may take their jobs or “Watch out! Islamic fundamentalist will take over the West!”²⁵ they are afraid of terrorism, organize crime etc. which they identify with immigrants. Migrants then become actors in a security drama. This is a drama in which they and others are constructed in a dialectic of inclusion and exclusion and in which this dialectic appears as a struggle for survival²⁶.

M. Thiel perceives that problem similarly. He points out that threats to societal security constitute perceptions and/or actions that inhibit the expression of a minorities identity, be it through their culture, language, religion or any other form of self-expression²⁷. Like forbidding the use of the language, names and dress. In this case immigrants become themselves an object of societal security.

If the institution that reproduce language and culture are forbidden to operate, then identity cannot be transmitted effectively from generation to the next. It cannot survive. It is important to notice that in case of ethnic groups the reproduction can also be disrupted by changing the balance of the population. So for some, foreign presence (immigration), can be perceived as a threat. In the migration contexts even if some is allowed or welcomed, there may come a point where simple numbers begin to be seen as a threat in identity terms.

The migration issue and security rise ambivalent feelings. Most people in Europe are torn between fears of “the others” and tolerance. Quoting W. Kymlicka and K. Banting, this ambivalence is reflected in the trajectory of public policies in many countries, from openness to and accommodation of immigrant to backlash and retrenchment, from

models of postnational multiculturalism to native populism²⁸. Or, as I. Wallerstein suggests that we are the witnesses on contemporary political discussion on multiculturalism versus “lepnization”²⁹.

The immigration may have influence on welfare state and can be seen as a threat to it. According to Kymlicka and Banting the general idea is that a viable welfare state depends on achieving and maintaining a high level of solidarity among citizens and that this in turn resets on feeling of commonality among citizens. So if this idea is right, then there is a potential trade-off between a more open approach to immigration and the maintenance of a robust welfare state.

But on the other hand it is not so obvious³⁰. Why? Because first of all the ethnic diversity makes it more difficult to sustain expansive social programs, because it is difficult to generate feeling of national solidarity and trust across ethnic lines. It is also important to notice that multiculturalism policies adopted to recognize or accommodate ethnic groups tend to further undermine national solidarity and trust³¹.

This may create challenges or threats for stability in European countries in the future. Because there is no reason to expect either that ethnic minorities will diminish as a percentage of the overall population in the most of the Western countries or they will abandon their claim for multiculturalism³². J. Huysmans argues that immigrants may be perceived for hosting society, that they are not part of “them”, so they should not benefit from the welfare state, which rightfully belongs only to nationals.

So the notions of social solidarity and distribution of welfare become intertwined with the notion of nationality and citizenship. Since immigrants and refugees are not citizens of a member state, they are not seen as members of that community, and therefore should not fully share the benefits of the internal market. He defined that as a “welfare chauvinism” as a linkage between nationality and welfare entitlements³³.

But there is no simple proportional formula for calculating when immigration become a threat³⁴. Immigration can both be seen as a threat but also as a boon. And it is not clear if migration is a real threat or the challenge. But it is also true that the differences between threat and the challenge is quite fluent. It is also true that the challenge may in certain conditions become a real threat. It is very important then to establish good practice and strategy facing this problems. In OECD rapport “Gaining from Migration. Towards a New Mobility System” the authors noticed that we have to change our thinking and acting on migration. It needs to be a shift from the old thinking to a new one. From the static to more dynamic. The consequence of a static thinking on migration was marginalization of them. The new thinking needs a more dynamic approach because process of migration is not static anymore³⁵.

6. DESECURITIZATION

In one of his works P. Roe argue that:

“What is most important to consider is the notion that if an issue can be shifted from normal politics to that requiring emergency measures, then, arguably, it can be shifted back again – it can be desecuritized” (Roe 2004: 282)³⁶.

How to desecuritize an issue of immigration? By using right strategy. J. Huysman introduced three desecuritization strategies in which the migrant is moved from “emergency” to “normal” politics³⁷.

6.1. The objectivist strategy

The objectivist consider security as something with an objective content. Those who are against securitization of migration point out that this “problem” is subjective and it only exist in the head of the people. Objectivist then will try to persuade people that migration is not a real threat. This can be presented with the help of statistics that shows that migrant can contribute to the wealth of society.

The general pictures in Europe, seem to understand that while control on immigrants are seen to be desirable by European, the majority, appear relatively sanguine about the presence of other nationalities and ethnic groups already settled in their country (till 11.09.2001). There were no directly xenophobic or racist fears, although anxieties over increased drug trafficking and organized crime as well as worries over loss of national identity, could be linked with increased immigration in the minds of respondents³⁸.




Figure 3. Source: Eurobarometer 2006

The overall picture is that European Union citizens (Figure 3) have balanced views about immigration; many respondents express insecurity, but when it comes to the presence of people from other ethnic groups, particularly with regard to unemployment (46%) the majority feel that immigrants enrich the cultural life of their country and relatively majority feel that immigrants are needed to work in certain sectors of economy. So as we can see there is no simple answer.

As Huysmans notices, proposed strategy has its other side, too. The objectivist desecuritizers reproduce the dichotomy native/migrant. This strategy runs the risk of strengthening what it seeks to weaken. And it can become a real threat in the future.

6.2. The constructivist strategy

This strategy is not on determining whether or not something is really a threat. The security is interpreted as a social construction. It wants to understand how the process of securitization works. Then it is understood that he/she will try to formulate a possible action to desecuritize the story of the migrant. The aim is to handle the process and to try to prevent the success of securitizing act.

6.3. The deconstructivist strategy

As Huysmans stated, to tell a story is to handle the world. The story of the migrant can be told in a way that takes migration out of “security drama”. The migrant is revealed as being someone with multiple identities and therefore is like “us”³⁹.

Wæver proposes also three options (strategies) of desecuritisation⁴⁰. Firstly he suggests that it is simply better not to talk about issues in terms of security (but it can brought us to false security). Secondly, once an issue has been securitized “*to keep the responses in forms that do not generate security dilemmas and other vicious spirals*”. And thirdly it is to move security issues back into “normal politics”. But he does not suggest how to do it.

We can also distinguish other forms of acting chosen by government, both negative and positive. One of these is creating distance. It includes tighter border controls, increased visa requirement, readmission agreements, accelerated return procedures, computer registration system. All this practice were implemented by the late 1980s and soared after 9/11. Europe has adopted buffer zones, Eurodoc fingerprints and Schengen Information System database⁴¹. The Hague Programme also stressed the further gradual establishment of integrated management system for external border of the EU.

Return strategy is another one. It is direct for migrants who are already inside the other territory. And its aim is to oblige them to return to their native territory. Right wings parties in Europe try to implement this policy as well as a strategy of ghettoization. The strategy of deconstruction of the otherness of the migrant is another example of negative

strategy. One of its forms is assimilation, which eliminate the identity of the others in turning him/her into one of “us”⁴².

On the other hand we can indicate integration strategy. From a macro perspective the integration refers to the characteristic of a social system. The more a society is integrated, the more closely and the more intensely its constituent parts relate to one another. Then there is no acceptance to securitize an issue of immigration. From a micro perspective, all groups and individuals display a certain degree of integration within a given society⁴³. The Rapport for European Commission, distinguishes four dimensions to integration:

- (1) socio-economic;
- (2) cultural;
- (3) legal and political; and,
- (4) the attitude of recipient societies towards migrants⁴⁴.

There are also different models of integration like guestworker model, assimilation model and ethnic minorities model, or multicultural model. They are partly connected with above mentioned strategies.

And another thing which has to be mention here is citizenship tests. Sue Wright suggests that one of its role is a gate keeping mechanism, designed to make it harder for would-be citizens to join the nation⁴⁵.

It is important to notice that there is significant role of non-state actors in regulating immigration (privatization of security policy). There are three types of actors – private, local and international. All of them have been incorporated by liberal states to monitor external and internal sites, including questions of entry, stay and exist of immigrants⁴⁶.

7. CONCLUSION

Closing up I may stress that because the migration process rose so many ambivalent feelings, it is very difficult to say that there is already a threat for European security. Especially when the differences between a threat and a challenge is quite vague. In my opinion the migration is rather a challenge. But that challenge may in certain conditions become a real threat. So it is very important to establish a good strategy and choose a good practice facing this problem like create European immigration and refugee regime⁴⁷.

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- ⁵ <http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/about-migration/facts-and-figures/regional-and-country-figures>
- ⁶ <http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/about-migration/facts-and-figures/regional-and-country-figures>
- ⁷ BAMF (2005) *Migrationsbericht des Bundesamtes für Migration Und Flüchtlinge im Auftrag der Bundesregierung Nürnberg – (Migrationsbericht 2005)*, Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, (quoting after:) T. Faist, *Diversity – a new mode of incorporation*, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 32, Issue 1, January 2009, p. 171.
- ⁸ N. Ibryamova, *Migration from Central and Eastern Europe and Societal Security in the European Union*, Jean Monnet/ Robert Schuman Paper Series, vol. 1, n° 2, August 2002, <www.alde.eu/fileadmin/files/Download/migration-p>
- ⁹ W. Anioł, *Migracje międzynarodowe a bezpieczeństwo europejskie*, Warszawa 1992, p. 17.
- ¹⁰ B. Buzan, *Peoples, States and Fears. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, London 1991, pp. 18-19.
- ¹¹ Critical Security Studies (CSS) is a self-consciously and heterodox approach to theorizing about security issues that emerged in the 1990s. Rejecting the largely neorealist and statist mindset of Cold War era security studies, it aims at both theoretical re-conceptualizations of what ‘security’ is, as well as empirical

investigations of whether conventional security-enhancing practices actually deliver. Additionally, CSS has served an important function by broadening the scope of the debate within security studies via the introduction of postpositivist perspectives (feminist, postcolonial, neo-Marxist, constructivist, sociological, and postmodernist)

¹² G. King, Ch. J. L. Murray, *Rethinking Human Security*, Political Science Quarterly, February 2001, vol. 116, n° 4, p. 588.

¹³ That is: 1) Focused: the theory and practice of security should promote emancipator politics; 2) Deeper: security is understood as a derivative concept inasmuch as different understanding of world politics will deliver different conceptions of what security means and who its ultimate reference; 3) Broader: the threat and use of military force is neither the only threat to security, nor the only means of providing security, (see:) R. Wyn Jones, *Security, Strategy and Critical Theory*, Boulder 1999.

¹⁴ B. Buzana *Peoples, States and Fears: The National Security Problem in the International Relations*, Prentice-Hall; 2nd edition, 1991.

¹⁵ O. Wæver, *Societal security: the concept*, (in:) Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe, O. Wæver, B. Buzan, M. Kelstrup, P. Lemaitre (ed.), Londyn 1993, pp. 23-25.

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¹⁶ National or nation-like identities range from the rather small group (Welsh, Silesian etc.) through major nations like Poles, French, to a larger but vaguer civilisational idea of Europeans. Religious identities range wider scale (Christendom, Islam) but usually contain subdivision powerful enough to constitute political significant distinct identities (Catholic, Protestant, Sunni). Were religious and national identities reinforce each other they can create very strong identities and very strong patterns of fear, hostility and social insecurity (Orthodox Greeks vs. Islamic Turks), (see.) O. Wæver, *Societal security: the concept*, op.cit.

¹⁷ Ibidem.

¹⁸ Ibidem p. 23.

¹⁹ B. Buzan, *Societal security*...p. 43, see also, Frei, *Sicherheit. Grundfragen der Weltpolitik*, Verlag W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 1977, pp. 17-21.

²⁰ B. Buzan, O. Wæver, J. de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Boulder, London 1998, p. 24-27, see also T. Balzacq, *The Three Faces of Securization: Political Agency, Audience and Context*, in European Journal of International Relations 2005, vol. 11, n° 2.

- ²¹ See: T. Balzacq, *The Three Faces of Securization: Political Agency, Audience and Context*, European Journal of International Relations 2005, vol. 11, no. 2, H. Stritzel, *Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond*, European Journal of International Relations 2007, vol. 13, no.3, O. F. Knudsen, *Post-Copenhagen Security Studies: Desecuritizing Securitization*, *Security Dialog* 2001, vol. 32, no. 3, P. Roe, *Securitization and Minority Rights: Condition of Desecuritization*, *Security Dialog* 2004, vol. 35, n° 3.
- ²² B. Buzan *Societal security*, ...pp. 43-45.
- ²³ B. Buzan, *Societal security*.... pp. 46-53.
- ²⁴ A. Kicinger, *International Migration as Non-Traditional Security Threat and the EU Responses to this Phenomenon*, CEFMR Working Papers, 2/2004, pp. 2-3, http://www.cefmr.pan.pl/docs/cefmr_wp_2004-02.pdf.
- ²⁵ J. Huysmans, *Migrants as a security problem*, in: Migration and European Integration. The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion, D. Thränhardt, R. Miles (ed.), Madison, Teaneck 1995, pp. 54-55.
- ²⁶ J. Huysmans, *Migrants as...* p. 59.
- ²⁷ Ibidem p. 63.
- ²⁸ M. Thiel, *Identity, Societal Security and Regional Integration in Europe*, (in:) Jea Monnnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series, Vol. 7, n° 6, April 2007, p. 5, <http://aei.pitt.edu/8175/01/Thiel_IDSocietSec_long07_edi.pdf>
- ²⁹ W. Kymlicka, K. Banting, *Immigration, Multiculturalism, and the Welfare State*, *Ethics & International Affairs*, Vol. 20, Issue 3, 2006, <http://www.questia.com/>
- ³⁰ I. Wallerstein, *Koniec świata jako znamy*, Warszawa 2004, pp. 132-134, *The End of the World As We Know It: Social Science for the Twenty-first Century*, Minneapolis University of Minnesota Press, 1999.
- ³¹ W. Kymlicka, K. Banting, op. cit.
- ³² Ibidem.
- ³³ Ibidem.
- ³⁴ J. Huysmans, *The European Union and Securitization of Migration*, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 2000, vol. 38, no. 5, pp. 756-8, *Contested Community: Migration and the Question of the Political in the EU*, (in:) *International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration: Power, Security and Community*, London, New York 2000, p. 161, quoting after N. Ibryamova, *Migration from Central and Eastern Europe and Societal Security In the*

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- 35 B. Buzan, *Societal Security, State Security and Internationalisation*, (w:) Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe, O. Wæver, B. Buzan, M. Kelstrup, P. Lemaitre (red.), Londyn 1993, p. 43.
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- 43 J. Huysman, op. cit. p. 62.
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- 47 G. Lahav, *Migration*... p. 92.

- ⁴⁸ See, H. Overbeek, *Towards a New international migration regime: globalization, migration and the internalization of the state* (in:) Migration and European Integration. The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion, D. Thränhardt, R. Miles (ed.), Madison, Teaneck 1995, pp. 30-31, also A Comprehensive European Migration Policy, Monday 14 2007, by European Commission, http://www.libertysecurity.org/imprimer.php?id_article=1447

